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1980/12/31

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INFO RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY
RUEHMG/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUEHKY/USDAO TOKYO
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AMEMB BANGKOK FOR CODEL SOARZ
SUBJ: IR ~~(U)~~
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1. (U) CTRY: CHINA (CH)V

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* CONFIDENTIAL * PAGE 01
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WW KU) TITLE: MND GENERAL SPEAKS TO STRATEGIC ISSUES (U)

3. (U) DATE OF INFO: IPGWWO

4. (U) ORIG: [REDACTED]

5. (U) REQ REFS: [REDACTED]

6. (U) SOURCE [REDACTED]

7. ~~C/NF0RM~~ SUMMARY: [REDACTED]

MANY OF THE ANSWERS WERE RECURRING THEMES SUCH AS THE SUSTAINED BELIEF IN SOVIET WORLD-WIDE HEGEMONISTIC ASPIRATIONS. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, POINTS OF EMPHASIS THAT WILL BE OF INTEREST TO THE ANALYST. AMONG THEM:

--THE CALL FOR A UNITED FRONT AGAINST THE USSR, INCLUDING THE US.

--REJECTION OF A US-SINO ALLIANCE AGAINST RUSSIA.

--REJECTION OF TAIWAN AS A MILITARY THREAT TO THE MAINLAND.

--CONTINUED RELIANCE ON PEOPLE'S WAR AS THE SOLE ALTERNATIVE IN A MILITARY WITH INADEQUATE EQUIPMENT.

--SUPPORT OF THE PLA LEADERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BEFORE MILITARY MODERNIZATION.

--IF TAIWAN TURNS TO THE USSR, CHINA WOULD USE FORCE FOR REUNIFICATION.

8A. ~~C/NF0RM~~ DETAILS:

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION:

A. QUESTION: WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN CONVENTIONAL AND STRATEGIC TERMS?

ANSWER: AS FOR THE MILITARY BALANCE I WANT TO TALK ABOUT SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY. WE BELIEVE THEIR MILITARY STRATEGY SUPPORTS THEIR POLITICAL AMBITIONS FOR WORLD DOMINATION. THESE PAST YEARS THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH HAS GROWN AND THEY ARE PREPARED FOR A CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR WAR. OF COURSE THE BEST WAY IS TO WIN WITHOUT FIGHTING, SO THEIR MILITARY FORCES HAVE DEVELOPED VERY QUICKLY. THE TOTAL FORCES FOR THE SOVIET UNION ARE 4.4 MILLION, ABOUT TWO TIMES THE US. IN TERMS OF CONVENTIONAL AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS THEY EXCEED THE US. SINCE THE US IS THE

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SOVIET'S MAJOR ADVERSARY THEIR OBJECTIVE IS TO BUILD MILITARY FORCES TO SURPASS THEM.

B. QUESTION: IF WAR COMES BETWEEN THE US AND USSR, OUR ALLIES WOULD ALSO BE INVOLVED. IF THE WAR SPREADS TO ASIA, POSSIBLY CHINA AND JAPAN MIGHT BE INVOLVED. WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ON THE SOVIET UNION AND

THE ALLIES ON ONE HAND VERSUS THE US AND ITS ALLIES ON THE OTHER?

ANSWER: I'VE JUST MENTIONED THAT THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE SSR SUPPORTS ITS POLITICAL AMBITION TO CONQUER THE WORLD. IT IS NOT JUST THE US THAT MUST DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION BUT WESTERN EUROPE, CHINA, JAPAN AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES AS WELL. THE STRATEGIC POINT REQUIRES US TO BE UNITED. IF WE ARE UNITED THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE WEAK AND WE WILL BE STRONG.

C. QUESTION: WE HAVE ALLIANCES WITH KOREA, JAPAN WESTERN EUROPE AND OTHERS. ARE YOU SUGGESTING THAT CHINA SHOULD BE A PART OF THE FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH WAS DEVELOPED IN PAST YEARS?

ANSWER: IN MY OPINION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD SITUATION TODAY REQUIRES NEW UNITY. THE FORM MAY NOT BE LIKE THAT OF WW II AND IT MAY NOT LINK NATIONS TOGETHER WITH TREATIES. IN REALITY I DON'T THINK THE US FAVORS THE IDEA OF CHINA AS AN ALLY. ALSO WE DON'T THINK THE EEST WAY OUT FOR CHINA IS TO BECOME AN ALLY OF THE US. IF CHINA AND THE US WERE LINKED BY AN ALLIED RELATIONSHIP THIS MIGHT PLACE BOTH IN A DIFFERENT SITUATION. IN MY OPINION WHEN THE WORLD SITUATION DEVELOPS, WE NEED NOT COPY THE FORMS OF HISTORY. WHEN WAR HAPPENS, WE CAN HAVE OTHER IDEAS.

D. QUESTION: WHAT DIFFICULTIES WOULD A FORMAL RELATIONSHIP PRESENT TO THE US AND CHINA?
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ANSWER: BECAUSE SOME NATION, ESPECIALLY IN THE
THIRD WORLD, HAVE UNFOVORABLE OPION BECAUSE OF
RECENT HOSTIRY, CHINA ALSO HAS THIS PROBLEM. ALSO,
SOME PROBLEMS CANNOT BE SOLVED BY WORDS SO WE CAN DEAL
WITH THE DANGER ACCORDING TO THE CONDITION.

E. QUESTION: WHAT FORM SHOULD THIS UNITY TAKE IF AN
ALLIANCE IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO COPE WITH SOVIET HEGEMONY?
ANSWER: I THINK WE CAN DO AS WE ARE NOW, HAVING

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STRATEGIC COORDINATION WHILE BEING ACCORDING TO OUR OWN CONDITION. I CAN SAY THIS IS FEASIBLE NOW. THE EXPRESSION THE CHINESE OFTEN USE IS A UNITED FRONT AGAINST HEGEMONY. IN THIS MANNER THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD STAND AGAINST HEGEMONISM.

F. QUESTION: I'M INTERESTED IN WHAT YOU WANT FROM THE US? DO YOU WANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO YOUR COUNTRY? DO YOU WANT THE US TO SELL ARMS TO CHINA?
ANSWER: THAT DEPENDS ON THE SITUATION, HOW IT DEVELOPS AND THE WILLINGNESS ON BOTH SIDES. I MEAN THE US CAN TAKE ITS ACTION ACCORDING TO ITS OWN CONDITIONS. BUT AS FOR WEAPONS SALES THAT IS ANOTHER ISSUE. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE US SELLS WEAPONS TO CHINA WE ARE OPPOSED TO SOVIET HEGEMONISM. WE HAVE ALWAYS HELD THAT WE CAN USE WHATEVER MEANS AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPLISH OUR ENDS. I HAVE BEEN A SOLDIER FOR OVER FORTY YEARS. OUR EXPERIENCE IN WAR IS THAT WE ALWAYS HAD INFERIOR WEAPONS. WE HOPE TO NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN OURS AND THE ENEMIES. IF NOT, THAT'S OK.

G. QUESTION: SOME SAY SINCE YOUR FOREIGN EXCHANGE IS LIMITED, COSTS PROHIBITS PURCHASES IN GREAT QUANTITY EVEN IF THE US WERE PREPARED TO SELL ARMS.
ANSWER: THERE ARE TWO QUESTIONS HERE. IS THE US WILLING TO SELL, AND SECOND CAN CHINA AFFORD TO BUY? I KNOW SOME PEOPLE IN THE US ARE ACTIVE (ON THE SUBJECT) OF SELLING WEAPONS TO CHINA. THOSE WHO TAKE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE ARE FOR THE SALE, THOSE WHO ARE NEGATIVE ARE AGAINST. THE US MUST FIRST SOLVE THIS CONFLICT. I WANT TO ADD THAT EVEN IF THE US CAN SELL US WEAPONS OR TECHNOLOGY, WE WILL NOT DEPEND SOLELY ON THE US. CHINA'S POPULATION IS LARGE AND NUMBER OF TROOPS GREAT. WE MUST RELY ON OUR OWN EFFORTS. BUT IF THE US CAN TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA TO REFORM OUR EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD BE GOOD FOR US. SOME PEOPLE THINK WE RELY ON US HELP- THAT IS A WRONG IDEA.

H. QUESTION: DO YOU HAVE A DRAFT?
ANSWER: YES. WE HAVE A COMPULSORY SYSTEM, HOWEVER SOME ARE VOLUNTARY.

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I. QUESTION: HOW LONG IS THE TOUR OF SERVICE?

ANSWER: FROM THREE TO FIVE YEARS DEPENDING ON THE SERVICE. WE WANTED TO SHORTEN THE TIME BUT CHANGED OUR MINDS. SOME SOLDIERS IN TECHNICAL FIELDS BECOME VOLUNTEERS.

J. QUESTION: WHAT PERCENTAGE OF YOUR SOLDIERS ARE DRAFTED AND WHAT PERCENTAGE STAY IN FOR A CAREER?

ANSWER: THE NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS IS NOT GREAT. THIS DEPENDS ON THE WORLD SITUATION. WE DO NOT SET A PERCENTAGE FOR VOLUNTEERS. FOR INSTANCE IN A REGIMENT WHERE TECHNICIANS ARE NEEDED, WE MAY ASK CONSCRIPTS TO REMAIN VOLUNTARILY. OFFICERS ARE CAREER SOLDIERS AND MAY STAY LONGER, I.E. FOR LIFE.

K. QUESTION: DO MEN IN SERVICE DO PUBLIC WORKS?

ANSWER: FOR A PERIOD SOLDIERS IN THE ARMY WERE ACTIVE IN PRODUCTION WORK. THIS HAS CHANGED AND MILITARY TRAINING IS EMPHASIZED. OUR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION WORKERS ARE ENGAGED IN MILITARY PROJECTS. THERE IS ONE GROUP, THE CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. THIS SERVICE IS NOT SUBORDINATE TO THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, BUT UNDER THE STATE COUNCIL.

L. QUESTION: ONCE A SOLDIER LEAVES THE ACTIVE FORCES DOES HE GO INTO THE RESERVES?

ANSWER: WE HAVE A MILITIA. ALL YOUTH CAN BE MILITIA BUT IN WAR THEY CAN BE SOLDIERS.

M. QUESTION: YOU SAID YOU WOULD BE INTERESTED IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. WHAT KIND?

ANSWER: THIS DEPENDS ON THE WILLINGNESS OF BOTH SIDES. THIS YEAR YOUR DEFENSE MISSIONS TO CHINA AND THOSE WHO WENT TO THE US DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT ALOT. IF POSSIBLE THESE DISCUSSIONS CAN CONTINUE. IF NOT, YOU CAN HAVE YOUR OWN WAY BUT WE HOPE THIS RELATIONSHIP CAN DEVELOP.

N. QUESTION: WHAT LESSONS DID THE CHINESE MILITARY LEARN IN THE SINO-SRV WAR?

ANSWER: MOST IMPORTANT WAS THAT TO GIVE THE SRV A FIGHT WAS BETTER THAN NOT TO FIGHT. WE VIEW THIS FROM AN OVERALL STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE. IN MY OPINION IF CHINA HAD NOT FOUGHT, TODAY'S SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WOULD BE WORSE. VIETNAM NOW HAS 1.2 MILLION

PAGE 03

* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ * 310833Z DEC 80

SECT 02 OF 04

* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *

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TROOPS. SIXTY PERCENT ARE PINNED DOWN NORTH OF
HANOI. IF WE HAD NOT DONE THIS (PROSECUTED THE
WAR) THE VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT HAVE DONE THIS. ALSO
THE THREAT TO THAILAND WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER. IN
TERMS OF LESSONS IN TACTICS DRAWN FROM THE BORDER
WAR, THIS SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED TODAY. IF AMERICAN
MILITARY OFFICERS COME TO CHINA AND WANT TO DISCUSS
THIS WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON TACTICS.
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PAGE 04 OF 04
310833Z DEC 80
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AMEMP BANGKOK FOR CODEL SOARZ

SUBJ: IR [REDACTED] (U)

C. QUESTION: IF VIETNAM INVADES THAILAND WOULD
CHINA GIVE THEM A SECOND LESSON?

ANSWER: WE ARE ALWAYS PREPARED AND HAVE SAID SO.
WE HAVE TOLD THAILAND THAT IF VIETNAM INVADES WE WILL

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PAGE 01
310833Z DEC 80

* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *

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STAND BY THEIR SIDE. AS FOR WHAT CONCRETE ACTIONS WE COULD TAKE THAT DEPENDS ON THE SITUATION.

P. QUESTION: DO YOU CONSIDER TAIWAN A THREAT TO THE MAINLAND?

ANSWER: I HAVE HEARD YOU HAD A LONG DISCUSSION (ON THIS SUBJECT) WITH ((ZHANG)) WENJIN. I AM A SOLDIER; I AM AFRAID I WOULD BECOME EMOTIONAL. NONETHELESS SINCE WE ARE FRIENDS WE SHOULD COORDINATE OUR STRATEGY. WE HOPE THE US WILL BE CAUTIOUS CONCERNING TAIWAN. IF YOU GO TOO FAR IT WILL HARM THE FEELING OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND IN TURN HARM OUR RELATIONS. I HAD AN EMOTIONAL DISCUSSION ON THIS ISSUE WITH MR. ALLEN. PLEASE GIVE HIM MY REGARDS.

Q. QUESTION: DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCERN ABOUT TAIWAN ATTACKING THE MAINLAND?

ANSWER: TAIWAN IS INCAPABLE. BUT UP TO NOW THE US IS SELLING WEAPONS AND THIS WILL DESTROY THE CURRENT SITUATION. WE HOPE THAT UNIFICATION CAN BE FULFILLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. HOWEVER, IF YOU ENCOURAGE TAIWAN AGAINST THE MAINLAND YOU GO BEYOND THE POLICY FRAME-WORK OF THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS. THIS WOULD DESTROY THE OVERALL STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

WE WILL NEVER SELL OUR SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE, EVEN TO MAKE FRIENDS. THIS QUESTION IS NOT NEGOTIABLE. AS A CHINESE SOLDIER I WOULD BE TRIED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE IF I DIDN'T OPPOSE ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. IF TAIWAN TURNED TO THE USSR OR REFUSED FOREVER TO RETURN TO THE EMBRACE OF THE MOTHERLAND, FINALLY WE MUST RESORT TO FORCE. SOME SAY THE CHINESE TROOPS AND NAVY ARE TOO WEAK. BUT AS A CHINESE SOLDIER IF WE ARE COMPELLED IN THE FUTURE, WE WILL THINK A WAY OUT, AND USE VERY MEANS POSSIBLE.

R. QUESTION: IN WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION, DO YOU BELIEVE YOUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD DETER SOVIET USE OF THE SAME?

ANSWER: OUR NUCLEAR FORCES ARE VERY SMALL. EVEN IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKS WE WILL NOT RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HAVE A SMALL SCALE AFFORDABLE NUCLEAR FORCE. WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WE CAN RESIST AGAINST

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***** PAGE 02
310833Z DEC 80

* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *

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THEM BUT PERHAPS THERE WILL BE GREAT CASUALTIES
OVER A LONG TIME. I DON'T BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION
CAN WIPE US OUT.

S. QUESTION: DO YOU BELIEVE THE USSR WOULD USE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

ANSWER: THIS IS HARD TO PREDICT, BUT IF THEY USE
THEM THE CONFLICT WOULD EXPAND BEYOND THE TWO SIDES.

T. QUESTION: DO YOU ASSUME THAT YOUR FORCES
COUNTERING THE USSR WOULD BE ORGANIZED FORCES,
PEOPLE'S WAR OR GUERRILLAS?

ANSWER: OUR MILITARY IDEOLOGY IS STILL PEOPLE'S
WAR. OUR WEAPONS ARE UNDERDEVELOPED, SO WE MUST
USE PEOPLE'S WAR. EVEN IF OUR WEAPONS ARE
ADVANCED WE WOULD STILL USE PEOPLE'S WAR.

U. QUESTION: WHAT IS PEOPLE'S AR?

ANSWER: THERE ARE THREE SECTIONS OF OUR MILITARY
FORCES: THE FIELD ARMIES, LOCAL FORCES AND THE MILITIA.
THE FIELD ARMIES ARE MOBILE FORCES WHILE LOCAL FORCES
AND MILITIA FIGHT IN THEIR OWN REGIONS. IF A MAJOR
OPERATION BY THE ENEMY IS IN A REGION, THE FIELD
ARMY WILL BE THERE. LOCAL FORCES WILL COORDINATE
WITH THE FIELD ARMY. IF IT IS NOT A MAJOR
ENEMY FORCE, LOCAL FORCES AND THE MILITIA WILL FIGHT
THE BATTLE.

V. QUESTION: HOW MANY TROOPS ARE IN THE FIELD
ARMY AND MILITIA?

ANSWER: THE NUMBER OF FIELD UNITS IS KNOWN TO YOU.
I'VE READ IT. NUMBER OF LOCAL UNITS ARE DIFFERENT.
THE MILITIA ARE NUMEROUS, I'M NOT CLEAR HOW MANY,
PERHAPS ONE HUNDRED MILLION.

W. QUESTION: ARE THE MILITIA THOSE WITH PRIOR
MILITARY SERVICE?

ANSWER: SOME ARE DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS. THE MILITIA
MEN ARE ORGANIZED INTO DIVISIONS AND REGIMENTS.

X. QUESTION: HOW MUCH EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON CIVIL
DEFENSE IN YOUR PLANNING?

ANSWER: OUR CIVIL DEFENSE IS TWO SIDED, POSITIVE AND
PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE WE
HAVE ANTI AIR RAID TROOPS (AAA) AND ON THE DEFENSE

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SIDE A DIG TUNNELS.

Y. QUESTION: DO YOU HAVE SHELTERS IN ALL MAJOR CITIES?

ANSWER: YES, SOME ARE GOOD, SOME NOT SO GOOD. BEIJING'S ARE JUST SO-SO. PERHAPS THE TUNNELS YOU SAW WERE DUG BY THE MASSES. THOSE DONE BY SOLDIERS ARE BETTER. WE ARE INFERIOR IN WEAPONS SO WE MUST HAVE A SHELTER PROGRAM. THAT PROGRAM IS NEARLY ENDED BUT WE WILL IMPROVE THE OLDER ONES.

Z. QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE MAJOR WEAKNESSES IN THE PLA?

ANSWER: AAA, ANTI TANK, ANTI SUBMARINE.

AA. QUESTION: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE DECISION TO REDUCE THE (MILITARY) BUDGET?

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ACTION DIA(*)

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ANSWER: PERHAPS CHINA'S MILITARY ARE DIFFERENT FROM
THOSE OF THE US. IN THE US THERE ARE DISPUTES
BETWEEN US CIVILIANS AND MILITARY MEN. HERE IT IS
EASY FOR THE CHINESE SOLDIER TO UNDERSTAND THAT
WITHOUT DEVELOPMENT OF OUR INDUSTRY, AGRICULTURE AND
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY THERE CAN BE NO DEVELOPMENTS
IN NATIONAL DEFENSE. OF COURSE WE WOULD BE HAPPY

* CONFIDENTIAL *
***** PAGE 01
* 310833Z DEC 80
***** SECT 04 OF 04

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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
TO SEE A QUICK DEVELOPMENT, BUT IF THERE IS NO DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE TALKS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE IS FUTILE. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WOULD NOT LAST LONG. IF THE GOVERNMENT PUT ALL ITS MONEY IN NATIONAL DEFENSE IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATION. SO OUR MILITARY PLANNING MUST BE BASED ON DEPENDENCE ON EXISTING FORCES.

BB. QUESTION: WHAT DOES SUPPORTING MILITARY MODERNIZATION MEAN?

ANSWER: WE HOPE TO RAISE OUR MILITARY LEVEL BY MAKING FULL USE OF EXISTING WEAPONS. THIS IS THE CONTEXT IN WHICH WE VIEW MILITARY DEVELOPMENT.

BB. ~~(C/NF/NOFORN)~~ ORIG COMMENTS:

1. ~~(C/NF/NOFORN)~~



9. (U) PROJ NO: N/A

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10. (U) COLLMGMT CODES: AD
11. (U) SPEC INST: CIRC NO
12. (U) PREP BY [REDACTED]
13. (U) APP BY: [REDACTED]
14. (U) RE EVAL - NO
15. (U) ENCL: N/A
16. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

REVW: ~~29 DEC 86~~

BT

ACTION DIA(*)
INFO NIDS(*) SAGA(*) NMCC(*) J5(*) IADB(*) RDJTF:LO(*)
SECDEF(*) SECDEF(*) USDP(**) ASD:PAGE(*) NMIC(*)
RTS-2B(*) SWS(*) DC-4(*) AT(*) AIS(*) DIO(*) DE(*)
DB-1G(*) DB-2B(*) DB-2C(*) DB-4A(*) DT-1(*)
DIA FILE(*)
♦CSA WASHINGTON DC
♦CNO WASHINGTON DC
♦CSAF WASHINGTON DC
♦CIA WASHINGTON DC
♦SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
♦CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
♦DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

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